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**JACK FISHER**  
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**CITIZENSHIP:** British

**PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES:**

<b>MRes Economics</b> (Distinction), London School of Economics	2017-2019
<b>MPhil Economics</b> (Merit), University of Oxford	2014-2016
<b>BSc Economics</b> (First Class Honours with Distinction), University of York	2011-2014

**DOCTORAL STUDIES:**

London School of Economics 2019-2023 (Expected)

**Thesis Title:** "Essays in Labor Economics and the Gig Economy"

**Thesis Supervisors and References:**

Prof Johannes Spinnewijn (Advisor)  
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**TEACHING AND RESEARCH FIELDS:**

**Primary Fields:** Labor Economics

**Secondary Fields:** Industrial Organization, Public Economics

**TEACHING EXPERIENCE:**

<b>EC426 Public Economics</b> <i>Teaching Fellow for Frank Cowell, Camille Landais, Johannes Spinnewijn &amp; Xavier Jaravel</i>	2021-2023
<b>EC325 Public Economics</b> <i>Graduate Teaching Assistant for Camille Landais &amp; Daniel Reck</i>	2021-2022
<b>EC402 Econometrics in R</b> <i>Graduate Teaching Assistant</i>	2021-2022
<b>EC270 Public Economics</b> <i>Summer School Class Teacher for Camille Landais, Daniel Reck &amp; Pasquale Schiraldi</i>	2018, 2022

**RELEVANT POSITIONS HELD:**

Research Assistant for Alessandro Gavazza	2020-2021
Research Assistant for Henrik Kleven, Camille Landais & Johannes Spinnewijn	2016-2019
Research Assistant for François Gerard & Joana Naritomi	2017-2018
Postgraduate Intern, Bank of England	2016

**LANGUAGES & SKILLS:**

English (native), Matlab, R, Stata

**HONORS, SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS:**

Royal Economic Society Covid Fund (LSE)	2021-2022
ESRC Studentship (LSE)	2017-2022
ESRC Studentship (Univ. of Oxford)	2014-2016
Balliol Economics Scholarship (Univ. of Oxford)	2014-2016
Andrew Meechan Prize (Univ. of York)	2014
Head of Department Prize (Univ. of York)	2013, 2014

**COMPLETED PAPERS:**

**Job Market Paper:** "Worker Welfare in the Gig Economy"

Around the world, the last decade has seen rapid growth in the prevalence of individuals earning income from digital platforms that mediate work for the solo self-employed—gig work. Concerns that these work arrangements undermine labor protections have motivated regulatory legislation. But policymakers suffer from a lack of evidence that quantifies the benefits of gig work and how prospective policies affect worker

welfare. I use unique administrative data, which spans the UK's food delivery market, to estimate worker surplus in this typical gig labor market. Evidence that workers learn about their own value of gig work over time, which a new survey corroborates, allows for the identification of the joint distribution of gig work valuations and outside options. Structural estimates imply a median monthly surplus for a gig worker equal to one third of the median employee's monthly income, and an aggregate annual welfare gain of £15bn from a labor market that was nascent a decade ago. Policymakers face a steep trade-off between ensuring benefits for full-time gig workers and maintaining gig work's appeal to low-hours participants, who enjoy most of the aggregate surplus. A counterfactual policy evaluation, which is calibrated to match aspects of California's Proposition 22, supports this conclusion.

**Other Papers:**

"The Cost of Labor Supply Biases"

This paper investigates an important dimension of the typical flexibility versus security trade-off that is used to frame self-employment. Namely, behavioral frictions that hinder workers from exploiting flexibility. I study the welfare cost of behavioral biases in intensive margin labor supply decisions for a group of self-employed workers who are free to pick their hours. In response to salient wage variation, workers' behavior implies a large and positive daily Frisch elasticity of 0.80 (s.e. 0.10). But in response to more common wage fluctuations their labor supply function is downward sloping for a range of wages, which is incompatible with even the most unrestrictive models of labor supply. In the spirit of Chetty-Looney-Kroft (2009), I use the salient Frisch elasticity to characterize preferences, and contrast outcomes under observed and optimal labor supply. A new sufficient statistics formula translates these deviations into daily welfare losses that are found to be economically significant; point estimates range from two to six percent of daily income. Annually, this can imply welfare losses of over £1000 for those affected.

"Refinancing Cross-Subsidies in the Mortgage Market"

*With Alessandro Gavazza, Lu Liu, Tarun Ramadorai & Jagdish Tripathy*

In household finance markets, inactive households can implicitly cross-subsidize active households who promptly respond to financial incentives. We assess the magnitude and distribution of cross-subsidies in the mortgage market. To do so, we build a model of household mortgage refinancing and structurally estimate it on rich administrative data on the stock of outstanding UK mortgages in June 2015. We estimate sizeable cross-subsidies during this sample period, from relatively poorer households and those located in less-wealthy areas towards richer households and those located in wealthier areas. Our work highlights how the design of household finance markets can contribute to wealth inequality. Estimated cross-subsidies may differ in more recent periods given changes in the UK mortgage market since 2015.